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Abstract
We consider a multilateral Nash demand game where short-sighted players come to
the bargaining table with requests for both coalition partners and the potentially gen-
erated resource. We prove that group learning leads with probability one to complete
cooperation and a strictly self-enforcing allocation (i.e., in the interior of the core).
Highlighting group dynamics, we demonstrate that behaviors which appear destruc-
tive can themselves lead to beneﬁcial and strictly self-enforcing cooperation.
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1 Introduction
This paper develops a noncooperative model of multilateral bargaining in which group learn-
ing leads to convergence of allocations to the subset of the core which is strictly self-enforcing.
∗I am indebted to Eric Maskin for his guidance during the development of this work, and to Dirk Berge-
mann and Larry Samuelson for their valuable comments and suggestions. I thank the NSF for ﬁnancial
support in the early stages of this work. This paper is a signiﬁcant revision of the third chapter of my
doctoral dissertation at Princeton University.
†Address: Dept. of Economics and the Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, 30 Hillhouse Ave.,
New Haven, CT 06511. E-mail: kareen.rozen@yale.edu. Home page: http://www.econ.yale.edu/∼kr287/.The literature on multilateral bargaining has a rich history, including Baron & Ferejohn
(1989), Krishna & Serrano (1996), Chatterjee, Dutta, Ray & Sengupta (1993), Perry & Reny
(1994), and Konishi & Ray (2003), with the latter three ﬁnding noncooperative bargaining
foundations for the core (which consists of weakly self-enforcing allocations). In contrast
to such papers, which typically examine the equilibria of dynamic bargaining games with
forward-looking players, we are interested in the learning process resulting from repeated my-
opic play of a static bargaining game that extends the canonical two-player demand model
of Nash (1950). We study learning in the bounded rationality or evolutionary sense of Fu-
denberg & Maskin (1992), Gale, Binmore & Samuelson (1995), and Mailath (1998), among
others.
In our model, formalized in Section 2, N players to come to the bargaining table with
demands for both a potentially generated resource and coalition partners. The groups that
form must be mutually compatible in terms of resource and partner requests, and their ability
to produce the resource is governed by a convex and strictly superadditive characteristic
function. We show in Section 3 that the set of strict Nash equilibrium outcomes of this
static game correspond to the set of strictly self-enforcing (interior core) resource allocations
and complete cooperation.
In Section 4 we study the learning process that results when this game is repeatedly
played over time by myopic (or short-lived) players. By permitting players to include or
exclude other players from their coalition, our model can capture ﬂavorful and realistic group
dynamics. In particular, group settings often display ineﬃcient and destructive behaviors.
Individuals can be excluded from groups or steal away other players’ partners. Groups may
take advantage of individuals who are desperate and alone, or have a scapegoat who absorbs
the impact of a group failure. Individual greed may lead to internal strife, and one group’s
actions can instigate conﬂict within another. We construct a learning process by which
the destructive behaviors of myopic individuals propel them towards strictly self-enforcing
cooperation. Essentially, we show that the behaviors above are too destructive to sustain
endless cycles of their use.
An interesting related paper by Agastya (1997) ﬁnds convergence to core (weakly self-
enforcing) allocations through learning in a demand bargaining model where only resource
requests are submitted. A main diﬀerence from this paper is that Agastya (1997) does
not model coalition selection.1 In our model, the dynamics of partner selection lay bare
1Because only resource demands are a strategic option for players, instead of modeling institutional details,
2an interesting convergent process in which conﬂict itself leads to cooperation. Moreover,
incorporating partner selection into the bargaining mechanism ensures that learning leads
to a strictly self-enforcing outcome. We also show in Section 5.1 that our results extend
when players have “pragmatic” preferences over partners: so long as excluding a given set
of players would not aﬀect her material payoﬀ, the probability a player is willing to exclude
them could depend on the properties of past play; for example, whether they excluded her
earlier.
2 Nash bargaining with N players
There is a group of N ≥ 3 players, denoted by I = {1,2,...,N}. Letting I be the set of
all possible coalitions, the resources a particular group may obtain is described by a convex
and strictly superadditive characteristic function v : I → R. Convexity means that there
are increasing returns to scale: for all S,T ⊆ I, v(S ∪ T) − v(S) ≥ v(T) − v(S ∩ T). Strict
superadditivity means that there are strictly positive synergies: if S ∩ T = ∅, v(S ∪ T) >
v(S) + v(T).
Players come to the bargaining table with two requests. First, as in the standard bilateral
demand game, player i requests some amount di ∈ [v(i),v(I)] of the resource for herself.
Second, player i speciﬁes a list of players Pi ∈ I with whom she is willing to form a coalition.
For notational simplicity, we assume that player i’s list always includes herself. The list of
all resource and partner requests submitted is given by (d,P), where d = (d1,d2,...,dN)
and P = (P1,P2,...,PN).
Not every combination of resource and partner requests is feasible. Letting Π(I) denote
the set of all coalition structures (i.e., partitions of I), a particular coalition structure π ∈
Π(I) will be feasible if all of its coalitions are mutually compatible and demand-feasible.
Mutual compatibility requires that for each group S ∈ π, no member j ∈ S is excluded
from the partner list of some other player in that group (i.e., there is no i ∈ S such that
j 6∈ Pi). Demand-feasibility is the simple condition that for each coalition S ∈ π containing
at least two players, the total amount of resource requested,
P
i∈S di, does not exceed the
Agastya uses two characteristic-function based properties that determine whether or not a demand will be
met. A limited form of coalition selection is permitted by Arnold & Schwalbe (2002), who allow players
to switch only among existing coalitions (hence groups cannot split, and entirely new coalitions cannot be
formed). They restrict the role of interaction by directly assuming that non-core allocations are unstable in
Assumption 3, which says players in blocking coalitions may play randomly.
3total amount of resource available, v(S). Strict demand feasibility of the coalition S means
that
P
i∈S di < v(S).
Each player has a strictly increasing utility ui : R+ → R over the resource (for ease of
exposition, we assume for now that the amount of resource received is the sole determinant
of utility; in Section 5.1 we consider a class of preferences that permits some preferences for
partners). A player i who remains unpartnered in π receives v(i) regardless of her resource
request. The utility of player i, under the requests (d,P) and the coalition structure π, is
given by ui(di) if π speciﬁes a nontrivial coalition for i, and ui(v(i)) otherwise. A request di
is individually rational for player i if di ≥ v(i), and strictly individually rational if the strict
inequality holds. There is always a feasible and individually rational coalition structure:
namely, the coalition structure where every player is unpartnered.
When more than one coalition structure is feasible, we assume that mutually compatible
and demand-feasible groups form when possible. Formally, deﬁning the norm ρ : Π(I) →
{1,2,...,N} of a coalition structure to be the number of coalitions formed, we assume that
the coalition structure that forms is chosen according to a ﬁxed probability distribution
with full support, F ∈ ∆Π(I), conditional on the set of feasible coalition structures with
minimal ρ-norm. For example, if N = 4 and Pi = {1,2,3} for i = 1,2 and Pj = {1,2,3,4} for
j = 3,4, then the coalition structures of minimal ρ-norm are {(1,2,3),(4)} and {(1,2),(3,4)}.
Assuming these are both demand-feasible, which of these two coalition structure emerges
will depend on the conditional distribution F(· | {{(1,2,3),(4)},{(1,2),(3,4)}}). Prior to
knowing which π forms, a player considers her F-expected utility over all feasible coalition
structures of minimal ρ-norm.2
3 Enforceability through exclusion
The core of a cooperative game with characteristic function v, deﬁned over the set of players




i∈I di = v(I) and
P
i∈S0 di ≥
v(S0) ∀ S0 ⊂ I
	
. We will be interested in the set of all strictly self-enforcing allocations
(i.e., the interior of the core, obtained by using strict inequalities above), which we denote
2As noted in Hart & Kurz (1983), which considers coalition formation more generally, it is not evident
how to predict which coalition structure forms if, for example, some member leaves a group. The minimal
norm rule is meant to reﬁne the prediction. The notions of coalitional compatibility suggested in Hart &
Kurz (1983) are related to but diﬀer from the deﬁnition here.
4Core
∗(v,I). The set of such allocations is nonempty: convexity implies that the core is
nonempty, and strict superadditivity implies it has a nonempty interior. In fact, each interior
core allocation corresponds to a strict Nash equilibrium outcome of our demand game.
Theorem 1 (Core equivalence). (d,P) is a strict Nash equilibrium outcome of the demand
game if and only if d ∈ Core
∗(v,I) and Pi = I for all i.
That an interior core allocation and Pi = I must be a strict Nash equilibrium outcome
is clear: any deviation surely yields a player strictly less of the resource. To understand
why being at an interior core allocation is necessary, it is helpful to make the following
observations.
Observation 1. In any strict Nash equilibrium, it must be that Pi = I for all i, that the
grand coalition is not strictly demand-feasible, and that di > v(i) for all i.
Indeed, switching from Pi to any P 0
i with Pi ⊂ P 0
i does at least as well: either the
resulting coalition structure has the same norm (in which case there is a weak increase in
the probability that i will be in a nontrivial coalition), or the norm decreases (in which case
i must have a partner, otherwise that coalition structure would have been feasible before).
Moreover, even though the grand coalition must be mutually compatible, it cannot be strictly
feasible because players would want to increase their resource requests.
Instead of concentrating on demand requests, our proof concentrates on when the players
have disincentives to exclude others, building upon what we call the exclusion principle:
you should never exclude a player who can steal away members of your coalition and leave
you alone. Excluding such a player increases your probability of remaining unpartnered and
receiving only v(i), thereby lowering your expected utility. The following example illustrates.
Example 1. Suppose that I = {1,2,3} and that v(i) = 0 for all i ∈ I, v({i,j}) = 1 for all
i 6= j, and v(I) = 3. Then
Core
∗(v,I) = {(d1,d2,d3) | di > 0 for all i,di + dj > 1 for all i 6= j, and d1 + d2 + d3 = 3}.
Consider the allocation d = (ε,ε,3 − 2ε) 6∈ Core
∗(v,I) for any ε ≤ 1
2 (although it is in
the core for ε = 1
2) and note that this is not a strict Nash equilibrium allocation for any
ε ≤ 1
2: player 1 can deviate by excluding player 3, since the coalition structure ({1},{2,3})
is infeasible by the resource constraint.
5The idea of the proof is as follows. If some player i has a feasible subgroup, then players
outside i’s subgroup must be able to steal away some of i’s partners to prevent i from
excluding them. That is, i must have some chance of ending up alone in the resulting
coalition structure in order to ensure that she strictly prefers not to restrict her set of
acceptable partners. But then, the same disincentive to exclude must exist for that other
feasible subgroup, and so and so forth. Continuing in this manner, more and more subgroups
must be feasible until ﬁnally, by convexity, the grand coalition will itself be strictly feasible.
However, if the grand coalition is strictly feasible, some player has an incentive to raise her
resource request, which contradicts being at a strict Nash equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 1. We now show that repeated use of the exclusion principle implies that I
cannot contain any demand-feasible subgroup. This would complete the proof, since being at
a strict Nash equilibrium would then require that
P
i∈I di = v(I). Suppose by contradiction
that a demand-feasible subgroup does exist. If there is exactly one such subgroup, then
any player i inside it may exclude any player j outside it (i.e., j 6∈ Pi) without aﬀecting
the feasible coalition structures containing i, and therefore without aﬀecting i’s payoﬀ —
a contradiction to being at a strict Nash equilibrium. Therefore, there must be more than
one feasible subgroup under d. Let ˆ I be the collection of players who have some feasible
subgroup. We aim to show that ˆ I is strictly demand-feasible: for if ˆ I = I, then the grand
coalition is strictly feasible, and if ˆ I ⊂ I, then the minimal norm rule ensures that any player
within ˆ I may safely exclude any player outside ˆ I.
Suppose that ˆ I is not feasible and that S1, the largest feasible subgroup of ˆ I, has size s.
To prevent any player i ∈ S1 from excluding any player j 6∈ S1, it must be the case (by the
exclusion principle) that j must have a feasible subgroup S2 containing some of i’s partners
in S1. For it to be possible that i could remain alone in a a feasible coalition structure of
minimal norm if she excludes j, it must be the case that j’s potential coalition S2 also has
size s. To see this, note that no subgroup strictly outside of S1 can be feasible, else the union
of the two would be feasible; and that for i to remain alone, the norm cannot increase when
j steals i’s partners. That is, the minimal norm rule here means that the only way a player
i can steal the partners of another player j is if player i can command a coalition which is
at least as large as j’s. The same exclusion principle holds for players in this next feasible
subgroup S2, and so on and so forth. Let {Sn}1≤n≤ ˆ N denote the collection of all the feasible
subgroups of size s. This collection must satisfy two properties:
6(1) No player can be in every largest feasible subgroup (i.e.,
T
n∈{1,..., ˆ N} Sn = ∅).
(2) If Sn 6= Sn0, then Sn ∩ Sn0 is a feasible subgroup.
Property (1) follows from the exclusion principle. Property (2) is a result of the following
simple observation and the fact that s is the size of the largest subgroup.
Observation 2. Suppose that the resource request vector d has only strictly individually
rational requests. If the two subgroups Sn and Sn0 are demand-feasible and Sn ∩ Sn0 is
demand-infeasible or empty, then Sn ∪ Sn0 is strictly demand-feasible.
This observation follows directly from the deﬁnition of convexity. Notice that by property
(2), S1 ∩ S2 must be a feasible subgroup, else the subgroup S1 ∪ S2 would be feasible and
of size larger than s. Inductively, for every k ≤ ˆ N, ∩k







would be feasible and of size larger than s. But then ∩
ˆ N
j=1Sj must be
nonempty, contradicting property (1) and completing the proof.
4 Learning to cooperate from conﬂict
We now consider the N-player demand bargaining game played over time t = 1,2,.... As in
much of the learning literature, the players can be interpreted as either successive generations
of short-lived players or as a ﬁxed set of myopic players.3 The players respond only to the
list of resource and partner requests (d,P) submitted in the previous period. Typically (with
probability 1 − ν very close to one, and independently of other players), a player chooses
a myopic best response to the previous period’s demands. When there are multiple best
responses, the player may choose any one of the strategies among which she is indiﬀerent.
With a small probability ν, however, a player is inert: she does not update her request,
leaving the previous period’s demand in eﬀect. Inertia may be interpreted in multiple ways;
these include capturing exogenous constraints on the ability to actively bargain, diﬃculties
in coordinating the timing of demands, learned behavior in the case of successive generations,
or the manifestation of bounded rationality (e.g., attentional issues, computational costs, or
simply slow updating of suboptimal strategies).
3The arguments also extend immediately to the case of multiple parallel populations that each population
samples or more general matching technologies.
7At each point in time, the previous period’s requests (d,P) serve as the state of the
game. To ensure existence, player i’s resource requests are restricted to the discretized set
[v(i),v(I)]K of K-place decimal fractions in [v(i),v(I)].4 The evolution of the game then
deﬁnes a ﬁnite-state Markov chain over the state space of players’ partner and resource
requests. We are interested in how the group learns to play over time.
Theorem 2 (Learning). For suﬃciently large K, the bargaining game converges with prob-
ability one to a state where d ∈ Core
∗(v,I) and Pi = I for all i.
Clearly, any strict Nash equilibrium corresponds to an absorbing state of the dynamic
process. Therefore, to prove this theorem we need only show that from any other state, the
process can reach an interior core allocation with positive probability.
In particular, we show that there is positive probability that the following sequence of
events will occur, in which eventual cooperation is the byproduct of familiar destructive
behaviors. If players in a group cannot agree on an interior core allocation, then they may
split into factions. Consequently, players may reach a situation where they are partitioned
into mutually exclusive blocs, each of which agrees on an interior core allocation of their
group. If any of these blocs consists of a lone player, then that player is desperate to
receive any strictly individually rational amount and can oﬀer to accept strictly less than
her marginal contribution to some group. If that group takes advantage of her oﬀer, an
interior core allocation of the enlarged group can be created. With only nontrivial blocs
remaining, each agreeing on an interior core allocation, one group S instigates conﬂict over
resources within another group S0 by inviting it to join and then rescinding the invitation -
after the invitees have all responded greedily. With the abandoned group S0 unable to agree
on a feasible allocation, one member is scapegoated and bears the burden of lowering her
request. If this happens repeatedly, the scapegoat eventually leaves the group and can be
picked up by S, creating an interior core allocation of the enlarged group. This process can
then repeat itself until S becomes the grand coalition. On the surface, these events take the
appearance of a “divide and conquer” process, although the players involved are myopic.
We now develop this argument more formally.
Proof of Theorem 2. As a preliminary step in the proof, consider groups which are alienated
from other players. Formally, suppose that the game is at a state (d,P) where d is not an
4We assume there is K∗ such that the values of v are K∗-place decimal fractions and that K ≥ K∗. It
will be the case that best responses are always in [v(i),v(I)]K.
8interior core allocation and there exists a group of players S ⊆ I such that every member of
S is excluded by every player outside S (Pi ∩ S = ∅ for all i 6∈ S), and vice-versa (Pi ⊆ S
for all i ∈ S). We ﬁrst show there is a positive probability that either the players in S come
to agree on an allocation in the interior core of their group, or disintegrate into factions. To
state this, we introduce the notation d|S and v|S for the restrictions of the allocation and
characteristic function, respectively, to the group S. The resource allocation dS is in the
interior core of S if d|S ∈ Core
∗(v|S,S).
Lemma 1 (Factionization). Suppose dS is not in the interior core of S and S is excluded by
I \ S. Then there is positive probability that the game moves to a state (d0,P 0) where either
the players in S all agree to an allocation in the interior core of S or a faction T ⊂ S has
broken away from S (i.e., P 0
i = T for all i ∈ T).
The proof of Lemma 1, which is in the appendix, builds on the exclusion technique
developed earlier. If groups which cannot agree on an interior core allocation split into
factions, then iterated application of Lemma 1 implies that from any nonabsorbing state,
the game can transition within ﬁnite time to a state (d∗,P ∗) where the coalition structure
is composed of mutually exclusive blocs, each in equilibrium with itself.
Observation 3. It is possible to reach a coalition structure π∗ where every group is alienated
from players outside it and agrees on an allocation in the interior core of their group (i.e.,
for all S0 ∈ π∗, P ∗
i = S0 for i ∈ S0, and if S0 is nonsingleton, then d∗|S0 ∈ Core
∗(v|S0,S0))
If this coalition structure π∗ is the trivial one {(1),(2),...,(N)}, then an interior core
allocation is only a step away, for the players are indiﬀerent among all requests. If π∗ is a
nontrivial coalition structure then the situation is a bit trickier. However, using the following
result we can assume that every bloc consists of at least two players. Indeed, suppose that
some player j is unpartnered, and therefore willing to accept any amount of resource larger
than v(j). We show that player j can join an existing group S - and create an interior core
allocation for S ∪ {j} - by oﬀering to accept strictly less than her marginal contribution.
Lemma 2 (Enlarging a strictly self-enforcing agreement). For large enough K, the game can
reach a state (˜ d, ˜ P) where S and j cooperate on an interior core allocation (i.e., ˜ Pi = S∪{j}
for all i ∈ S ∪ {j} and ˜ d|S∪{j} ∈ Core
∗(v|S∪{j},S ∪ {j})) and (˜ d, ˜ P) is the same as (d∗,P ∗)
for all other individuals.
9The states in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 correspond to weak Nash equilibria. We now
exhibit a path of play to a strict Nash equilibrium outcome (an interior core allocation)
using destructive group behaviors. Indeed, supposing there exist two distinct blocs S and
S0 (otherwise the argument is complete), the actions of S can lead to internal strife over
resources within S0, permitting defectors from S0 to join S ` a la Lemma 2.
To see how this may happen, suppose that the members of S and S0 mutually invite
each other; that is, simultaneously, every i ∈ S ∪ S0 requests (˜ di,S ∪ S0). In the next
period, if the players in S are inert, while every player j ∈ S0 best responds with the request
(˜ dj +v(S ∪S0)−v(S)−v(S0),S ∪S0) (i.e., each attempts to grab all the remaining surplus),
then the following result proves that continuing to invite members of S0 gives no additional
expected utility to members of S. That is, the requests of the members of S0 have rendered
those players useless to S.
Lemma 3 (Disposability). No member of S0 may feasibly join a coalition with any member
of S.
Suppose that the members of S abandon the members of S0, as they are willing to do in
light of Lemma 3. Speciﬁcally, suppose each i ∈ S best responds with (d∗
i,S) and that the
members of S0 are inert. Since S0 had been at an interior core allocation, their members are
unable to form any feasible coalitions with each other. In fact, if there is any player k ∈ S0
who is unable to obtain a payoﬀ bigger than v(k) by lowering her request, she may as well
exit the coalition by setting Pk = {k} and eventually join S ` a la Lemma 2.
Otherwise, at least one of the members of S0 will need to lower her request. Let us
consider what happens when this burden falls on one individual. Fix a scapegoat j ∈ S0 and
suppose she is the only player in S0 to lower her request in the next period. Suppose that j
can obtain her best-response payoﬀ by creating a coalition with just a subgroup of S0; then
she may as well modify her resource request accordingly and set Pj = S00, where S00 ⊂ S0 is
the smallest subgroup of S0 with which j may obtain her best payoﬀ. Note that the resulting
allocation would be in Core
∗(v|S00,S00). This group S00 could safely break away in the next
period, and S0 \ S00 could then itself split or reach an interior core allocation as Lemma 1
prescribes.
If the scapegoat j can only obtain a payoﬀ larger than v(j) by creating a coalition with
the entire group S0, then the resulting allocation will be in Core
∗(v|S0,S0). But now suppose
the process repeats itself with the same scapegoat: S and S0 mutually invite each other,
10S0 responds greedily, S abandons S0, and j bears the burden of lowering her request. This
need only be repeated a ﬁnite number of times before the scapegoat j’s best response is to
break away - at which point she may join S ` a la Lemma 2. Furthermore, S can repeat this
process against other groups until it grows to become the grand coalition and an interior
core allocation is reached.
5 Discussion
This paper demonstrates how ineﬃcient group behaviors can propel groups toward strictly
self-enforcing cooperative outcomes. In essence, we have shown that the destructive behav-
iors used here to achieve cooperation are too destructive to sustain endless cycles of their
use. We discuss two extensions of the model below.
5.1 Introducing preferences for partners
For ease of exposition, we have assumed that a player’s preferences depend on the resource
only. However, these results easily generalize to a class of preferences that permits players
to be pragmatically “behavioral.” So long as excluding a player does not aﬀect the expected
amount of resource obtained, the probability of a player being willing to exclude any given set
of players could, more realistically, be modeled to depend on the properties of past play; such
as which players have excluded them earlier, whether their request was recently satisﬁed,
and whether the player is sympathetic to someone who is unpartnered or instead attempts
to “ﬁt in” by excluding a player who has been excluded by others.
More formally, assume that the player may be described by a stochastic process over the
set of all preference relations over I, where every state has positive (but possibly negligible)
probability of being reached from any state, and where the probability of transition may
depend on the play of the game. Each player has a lexicographic preference, where she
cares primarily about the amount of resource obtained, and secondarily about maximizing
her preference over partners in her current state. For example, a vindictive player might,
with high probability, strictly prefer to exclude players who have excluded her earlier –
so long as doing so would not aﬀect her materially. While vindictive behavior evidently
enforces cooperation when players are forward-looking, the hope for cooperation might dim
when players are both myopic and vindictive. On the contrary, both our results and the
11convergent process exhibited carry through in this setting: the decision to include or exclude
a player simply becomes a matter of strict preference.
5.2 Sharper long run prediction
To reﬁne our prediction of interior core convergence further, we may introduce random
perturbations, as in Kandori, Mailath & Rob (1993), to show that as these shocks become
negligible, the outcomes persisting in the long run (i.e., stochastically stable, or in the support
of the limiting stationary distribution) correspond to those allocations within the interior
of the core that minimize the maximum individual wealth.5 This corresponds to a long
run lexicographic social preference for strict enforceability (primarily) and wealth equity
(secondarily).
5See the supplement posted on the author’s website for the proof. Agastya (1999) has a result of the same
spirit for the core rather than the interior core, using a diﬀerent learning process. Both papers generalize
the two-player result in Young (1993).
12Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Throughout, assume without loss that di > v(i), Pi = S for all i ∈ S
unless stated otherwise,
P
i∈S di ≥ v(S), and S and I \ S mutually exclude each other.
Imagine ﬁrst that S contains no feasible subgroups. If
P
j∈S dj = v(S), then condition
(1) of the lemma is satisﬁed and the proof is complete. If instead
P
j∈S dj > v(S) and no
subgroups are feasible, then whenever only one individual k best responds and the rest remain
inert, one of three things may happen: (a) the resulting allocation could be in the interior
core of the restricted game (again satisfying condition (1)), (b) the resulting allocation (d,P)
would no longer be strictly individually rational - then Pk = {k} is a best response for k and
Pi = S \ {k} becomes a best response for i ∈ S \ {k} in the subsequent period (satisfying
condition (2) of the lemma), or (c) the resulting allocation is strictly individually rational
for players in S,
P
j∈S dj ≥ v(S), and some subgroup of S is feasible. Consider the only
nontrivial case, (c). Deﬁne the largest group size sd = max{T⊂S:
P
j∈T dj≤v(T)} |T| and the
collection Td = { T ⊂ S |
P
i∈T di ≤ v(T) and |T| = sd }. There are two subcases.
Case (i). There is T ∈ Td such that for all i ∈ T, di is a best response to (d,P). If a
state satisfying condition (2) cannot be reached, no player j ∈ T may be indiﬀerent between
Pj = T and Pj = S: if j best-responds with (dj,T) and all others play the same best
response, then (dk,T) would be a best response for every k ∈ T in the following period and
condition (2) would be satisﬁed. So (dj,S) must be strictly preferred to (dj,T) for every
k ∈ T; this implies that for each j ∈ T, there is a feasible group of size sd containing another
member of T but not j. No player in T can be in every feasible group of size sd that contains
a member of T; and the intersection of these groups of size sd must be feasible, else a bigger
group is feasible. A contradiction can be found as in the proof of Theorem 1.
Case (ii). For all T ∈ Td, there is i ∈ T such that di is not a best response to (d,P). For
each (d,P) we may partition the members of S into the following three groups:
T(d,P) = {i ∈ S | di is a best response to (d,P) },
T
+
(d,P) = {i ∈ S \ T(d,P) | there is a best response d
∗
i to (d,P) with d
∗
i > di}, and
T
−
(d,P) = {i ∈ S \ (T(d,P) ∪ T
+
(d,P)) | there is a best response d
∗
i to (d,P) with d
∗
i < di}.
Beginning at state (d,P), let all players in T(d,P) ∪T
−
(d,P) be inert and let all players in T
+
(d,P)
raise their requests. Call the resulting state (d0,P 0). If T
+
(d0,P0) = ∅, stop; otherwise this can
be repeated a ﬁnite number of times until T
+
(˜ d, ˜ P) = ∅ in the resulting state (˜ d, ˜ P).
13Suppose that a state satisfying condition (2) cannot be reached. The outcome of every
player in S’s best response to (˜ d, ˜ P) must be strictly individually rational, else some k ∈ S
could best respond by setting Pk = {k} and a state satisfying condition (2) might result.
Also, T ∈ T˜ d ⇒ T 6⊆ T(˜ d, ˜ P), otherwise one returns to Case (1). Therefore, T
−
(˜ d, ˜ P) 6= ∅.
The ﬁrst task is to show that under (˜ d, ˜ P) and the assumption that condition (2) cannot
be satisﬁed, S cannot have any feasible subgroups. Suppose that there is at least one feasible
subgroup of S, and again denote by s˜ d the size of the largest such subgroup. T
+
(˜ d, ˜ P) = ∅ and
T ∈ T˜ d ⇒ T 6⊆ T(˜ d, ˜ P), so some i ∈ T
−
(˜ d, ˜ P) must be both included and excluded from feasible
subgroups of S of size s˜ d. If she were never excluded, lowering her request would not be a best
response. Note once more that no player can be in every feasible subgroup of size s˜ d (because
condition (2) cannot be satisﬁed), and that the intersection of any two such subgroups must
be a feasible subgroup (because no subgroup of size larger than s˜ d is feasible and S is not
strictly feasible). The same argument as in Case (1) leads to the desired contradiction.
Hence, S lacks feasible subgroups under (˜ d, ˜ P). Choose some k ∈ T
−
(˜ d, ˜ P) to best respond
and let all others be inert. The best response of k has d∗
k = maxT⊆S,k∈T v(T) −
P
j∈T\{k} ˜ dj.
If T ∗ ∈ argmaxT⊆S,k∈T v(T) −
P
j∈T\{k} ˜ dj for some T ∗ 6= S, then (d∗
k,T ∗) is optimal for k.
Next period, (˜ dj,T ∗) will be a best response for each j ∈ T ∗ \ {k}, a contradiction to the
assumption that condition (2) cannot be satisﬁed. Therefore, S forms and no subgroups of
S will be feasible, i.e. a state satisfying (1) will be reached.
Proof of Lemma 2. Any request is a best response for j; and those in S are indiﬀerent
about inviting players who exclude them. Fix m ∈ Z+. Suppose that in the same period,
player j requests (v(S∪{j})−v(S)−m·10−K,S∪{j}) and each i ∈ S requests (di,S∪{j}).
Next period, some k ∈ S requests (dk+m·10−K,S∪{j}) and players in (S∪{j})\{k} don’t




i∈S di = v(S). Deﬁne ε∗ = minS∩T=∅ v(S ∪ T) − v(S) − v(T), which is positive
by strict superadditivity, and assume K is large enough that m·10−K < ε∗. The assumption
on K guarantees that d0
j > v(j) is satisﬁed. For any S0 ⊂ S, we must show S0 ∪ {j} is














14If k 6∈ S0, then the infeasibility requirement is satisﬁed when
P
i∈S0 di > v(S0) + m · 10−K;
for then convexity and d0

















A technical issue arises only when ˆ S =

S0 ⊂ S,S0 6= ∅ |
P
i∈S0 di ≤ v(S0)+m·10−K	
is
nonempty and such that ∩S0∈ˆ SS0 = ∅. If ∩S0∈ˆ SS0 6= ∅, simply let the best-responding player k
be in ∩S0∈ˆ SS0. We will now show that ∃ K∗∗ ∈ Z+ such that ∩S0∈ˆ SS0 = ∅ is impossible when-
ever K ≥ max

K∗,K∗∗	
. Let K∗∗ = [log
|ˆ S|(m+1)+m
ε∗ ]+1 and suppose that ∩S0∈ˆ SS0 = ∅. Con-
vexity necessitates that
P
i∈S0∩S00 di ≤ v(S0∩S00)+(2m+1)·10−K, otherwise S0∪S00 is strictly
feasible, a contradiction to d|S ∈ Core
∗(v|S). Consider some S0 ∈ ˆ S and take S00 ⊂ S such
that S0 6⊆ S00 and S00 6⊆ S0. If
P
i∈S00 di = v(S00)+r·10−K for some r ≤ |ˆ S|(m+1)+m, then
by convexity it must be that
P
i∈S0∩S00 di ≤ v(S0∩S00)+(r+m+1)·10−K to avoid the contra-
diction that S0∪S00 is strictly feasible. Consider two distinct S1,S2 ∈ ˆ S and let T1 = S1∩S2.
T1 6= ∅, else S1∪S2 is strictly feasible. If T1 6= S1,S2 then
P
i∈T1 di ≤ v(T1)+(2m+1)·10−K;




i∈S1 di, and similarly for the case T1 = S2. In either
case,
P
i∈T1 di ≤ v(T1) + (2m + 1) · 10−K is the upper bound of interest. Inductively deﬁne
Tn = Tn−1 ∩ Sn+1 for 2 ≤ n ≤ R = |ˆ S| − 1. If Tn = ∅, one obtains a contradiction. We are
concerned with the case Tn 6= Tn−1,Sn+1 to get the upper bound on
P
i∈Tn di, which by con-
vexity is
P
i∈Tn di ≤ v(Tn)+[(n+2)m+n+1]·10−K. The ﬁnal intersection TR = TR−1∩SR+1
must be empty and a contradiction arises.
Proof of Lemma 3. Deﬁne d0 by d0
i = ˜ di + [v(S ∪ S0) − v(S) − v(S0)] · 1i∈S0, where
1X is the usual indicator function. First, we prove the following intermediate result using
convexity: take nonempty A,A0,B ⊂ I with A ∩ B = ∅ and A0 ⊂ A; and let d be such that
d|A ∈ Core
∗(v|A). If A0∪B is a feasible coalition under d, then A∪B is strictly feasible under
d. To see this, note that by convexity, v(A∪B)−v(A) ≥ v(A0∪B)−v(A0). By assumption,
both
P
i∈A0 di > v(A0) and
P





i∈A di = v(A) completes the proof of the claim.
15We claim that for any ∅ 6= S00 ⊆ S0,
P
i∈S00 d0
i > v(S ∪ S00) − v(S). To see this, note that




˜ di + |S
00|[v(S ∪ S
0) − v(S) − v(S





˜ di + |S
00|[v(S ∪ S
00) − v(S) − v(S
00)] − v(S ∪ S
00) + v(S)
≥ (|S
00| − 1)[v(S ∪ S
00) − v(S) − v(S
00)].
If S00 is non-singleton the last term is strictly positive, and if S00 is singleton the intermediate
term is strictly positive by strict individual rationality of the request. The lemma then
follows from the contrapositive of the intermediate claim.
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